In the schematic protection model subjects and objects are classi ed into protection types. Creation is authorized by a can-create binary relation on types. It is shown that with arbitrary cycles in can-create safety is undecidable. Whereas it has been previously shown safety is decidable for acyclic can-create. It is also shown that safety remains undecidable even if all creates are attenuating in that tickets capabilities given to a subject on its creation are attenuated copies of tickets available to its parent. This contrasts with decidable safety for attenuating cycles of length one. It appears safety is decidable for the practically useful cases while undecidability results from undue laxity in authorizing creation.
INTRODUCTION
The need for access controls or protection arises in any computer system in which multiple users share information and physical resources. These systems are viewed as consisting of subjects and objects. Active entities such as users are subjects whereas passive entities such as text les are objects. Protection is enforced by ensuring that subjects can execute only those operations which are authorized by privileges in their domains. We regard subjects and objects as mutually exclusive and use entity to denote either a subject or object. The key di erence is that subjects possess privileges whereas objects do not.
The protection state of a system is de ned by the privileges possessed by subjects in their domains at a given moment. We understand state to mean protection state. Inert privileges authorize operations which do not modify the state, e.g., reading a le. Control privileges authorize operations which modify the state, e.g., user X authorizes user Y to read le Z. Control privileges authorize incremental changes in the protection state and de ne the dynamics of authorization. Once the initial state is established the protection state evolves due to autonomous actions of subjects constrained by control privileges. The challenge is to construct the initial state so all reachable states conform with the policy the security administrator wishes to implement.
A useful protection model must provide a formalism for specifying the dynamics of the protection state. This is usually done by stating rules which prescribe the authorization for making localized incremental changes in the state. We call such a collection of rules an authorization scheme. The scheme embodies the policy for dynamic authorization. In order to understand the formal speci cation of a scheme it must be possible to determine the cumulative global e ect of authorized incremental changes in the protection state. That is given the initial protection state and the authorization scheme, we need to characterize protection states that are reachable. The safety problem poses the question: is there a reachable state in which some subject possesses a speci c privilege which it did not previously possess? It is the fundamental analysis question which a protection model must confront. Since subjects are usually authorized to create new subjects and objects, the system is unbounded and it is not certain such analysis will be decidable let alone tractable without sacri cing generality.
Analysis issues were rst formalized by Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman 2 in context of the well-known access matrix model 1, 5 . The matrix has a r o w for each subject and a column for each e n tity. The I,J cell contains symbols called rights authorizing subject I to perform operations on entity J. In this model an authorization scheme is de ned by a set of commands. Each command has a condition part and a body.
Subjects are often de ned to be a subset of objects. This amounts to calling what we call entities as objects and coining some other term for entities which are not subjects.
The condition speci es rights required to exist in the matrix before the body can beexecuted for its actual arguments. The bodyconsists of a sequence of primitive operations. The primitive operations enter or delete a right from a cell of the matrix or create a new row or column or destroy an existing row or column. A right is said to be leaked if it can be entered into a cell of the access matrix where it did not previously exist. The safety problem poses the question whether or not some speci c right can be leaked. Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman showed this problem is undecidable in general 2 . It was further shown by Harrison and Ruzzo 3 that safety remains undecidable even if the condition can test for rights in at most two cells of the matrix and the primitive operations are restricted to be monotonic. y In retrospect it is not too surprising that analysis is undecidable in this general setting. More disappointing is the lack o f i n teresting special cases of the access matrix model with tractable safety, as evident from the following quote 2 .
It would be nice if we could provide for protection systems an algorithm which decided safety for a wide class of systems, especially if it included all or most of the systems that people seriously contemplate. Unfortunately, our one result along these lines involves a class of systems called mono-operational," which are not terribly realistic. Our attempts to extend these results have not succeeded, and the problem of giving a decision algorithm for a class of protection systems as useful as the LRk class is to grammar theory appears very di cult.
In response to this situation we proposed the schematic protection model SPM to balance the inherently con icting goals of generality versus tractable safety analysis 14 . SPM classi es subjects and objects into protection types. The dynamic component of a protection state consists of tickets capabilities. The key idea is that the rules comprising the authorization scheme are speci ed in terms of protection types. In particular creation is authorized by a can-create binary relation on types. It has been previously shown that analysis is decidable provided the can-create relation is acyclic 14 . In this paper we show that with arbitrary cycles in can-create safety becomes undecidable. This gives us a natural demarcation between decidable and undecidable safety in SPM.
Undecidability results are disappointing since they re ect inherent limitations. But in this case our disappointment is mitigated by the conjecture that most, if not all, SPM speci cations of practical interest will satisfy the constraints of 14 . This is demonstrated by the examples of 12, 13, 14 and our failure to nd any realistic policy which cannot t within the assumptions of 14 . It appears that decidability i s obtained for the most useful cases while undecidability follows from undue laxity in authorizing subject creation, which can beeasily prevented. y That is it is possible to enter a right in a cell or create new subjects and objects, but deletion of a right from a cell or destruction of subjects and objects is not permitted.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews SPM. Section 3 shows that safety is undecidable with arbitrary cycles in can-create. The proof is by reduction from Post's correspondence problem. Use of Post's problem for this purpose was motivated by its successful application in showing undecidable safety for the monotonic access-matrix 3 . Our construction is quite intricate because of the local nature of authorization rules in an SPM scheme. In section 4 we show safety remains undecidable even if all create operations are required to beattenuating. Roughly speaking this requirement stipulates that tickets given to a created subject on creation should beattenuated copies of tickets available to the creator. This is a natural restriction whose signi cance is highlighted by the fact that with attenuating loops cycles of length one safety is decidable 14 . Section 5 concludes the paper.
THE SCHEMATIC PROTECTION MODEL
The key notion in SPM is that of protection types, henceforth referred to simply as types. The domain of a subject consists of two parts: a static type-dependent part de ned by the authorization scheme and a dynamic part consisting of tickets. The intuitive concept of types is that instances of the same type are treated uniformly in the authorization scheme. The scheme is de ned by the security administrator when a system is rst set up and thereafter cannot bechanged. The idea is major policy decisions are built into the scheme while details are re ected in the initial distribution of tickets. SPM entities are strongly typed, that is an entity's type cannot change.
Tickets are dynamic privileges of the form U x, where U identi es some unique entity and the right symbolx authorizes the possessor of this ticket to perform some operations on U. Tickets can only be obtained by rules speci ed in the authorization scheme. We use the neutral term ticket rather than capability t o a void the impression that SPM tickets are necessarily represented at run-time as capabilities. SPM tickets have only one right symbol. For convenience we abbreviate a set of tickets for the same entity b y letting U xyz denote fU x, U y, U zg. We understand U x to denote the ticket U x as well as the set fU xg as determined by context. This allows us for instance to write fU x, V yzg or U x V yz interchangeably.
TYPES AND RIGHT SYMBOLS
The rst step in de ning a scheme is to specify disjoint sets of object types TO and subject types TS. Their union T is the entire set of entity types. The intention is protection types identify classes of entities which have common properties with respect to the authorization policy. For subjects this might be membership in a department or a distinguished position of authority in a group such as project leader. For objects this might be a classi cation such as an internal document or a public document. By convention types are named in lower case and entities in upper case.
The type of an entity U is denoted by U . An entity of type u is often referred to as an u entity.
The next, or perhaps concurrent, step is to de ne the right symbols carried by tickets. The set of right symbols R is partitioned into two disjoint subsets: RI the set of inert rights and RC the set of control rights. Examples of inert rights are the typical read, write, execute and append privileges for a le. Because of the passive role of inert rights with respect to the protection state, the symbols in RI require no interpretation for safety analysis. The interpretation of symbols in RC will be discussed shortly. Every right symbolx comes in two variations x and xc where c is the copy ag. The only di erence between U x and U xc is that the former cannot becopied from one domain to another whereas the latter may be,provided certain additional conditions to be de ned shortly are true. It follows that presence of U xc in a subject's domain subsumes the presence of U x but not vice versa. We use x:c to signify x or xc with the understanding that multiple occurrences of x:c in the same context are either all read as x or all as xc. We understand U xyc to denote U xc and U yc, that is the copy ag applies to each symb o l i n t h e string. If the copy ag occurs in the middle of a string it applies to privileges to the left of it but not those to the right, for instance U xcyz denotes U xc and U yz.
The type of a ticket U x:c is written as U x:c and we de ne it to be the ordered pair U x:c. That is the type of a ticket is determined by the type of entity it addresses and the right symbol it carries. Conventions for representing tickets, especially regarding the copy ag, extend in an obvious way to ticket types. In particular U x and U xc are di erent ticket types. This is an important distinction because of the role of the copy ag. The entire set of ticket types is TR.
T, R and TR constitute the basic sets of an authorization scheme. The remaining components are de ned in terms of functions and relations involving these basic sets. SPM requires that T and R be nite, so a scheme is de ned by nite sets, relations and functions. Before considering the details we note SPM is monotonic in that there are no facilities for revocation of tickets or deletion of entities. This is a reasonable assumption for analysis purposes in most cases, by accepting the restoration principle 14 . This principle requires that whatever can berevoked can berestored, i.e., revocation can always beundone. Then for the worst-case we can assume revocation does not occur. In this way SPM side steps the issue of specifying revocation policies.
In SPM there are three operations which change the protection state: copy, demand and create. Demand is not used in the construction of this paper and is mentioned here only for the sake of completeness. Demand in now actually known to be formally redundant 15 .
THE COPY OPERATION
The copy operation moves a copy of a ticket from the domain of one subject to the domain of another leaving the original ticket intact. We often speak of copying a ticket from one subject to another, although technically a ticket is copied from one subject's domain to another's domain. In addition to the copy ag this operation is authorized by a link predicate link i de ned by control rights and its associated lter function f i which is a component of the scheme.
A link predicate takes two subjects, say U and V, as arguments and evaluates to true or false. If true it establishes a connection from U to V which can be used to copy tickets from the domain of U to the domain of V. Link predicates are de ned in terms of the presence of some combination of control tickets for U and V in the domains of U and V. F ormally a link predicate link i U,V is a conjunction or disjunction, but not negation, of terms from the following collection for x2RC U x2domU , U x2domV, V x2domU , V x2domV or true where domU is the set of tickets possessed by subject U. The idea is that link predicates are evaluated by examining the domains of the two subjects of concern and that too only with respect to presence of control tickets for these two subjects. To emphasize this property we say link predicates are local. That the de nition of a link should depend only on presence and not absence of tickets is a well-known principle for protection 10 . In SPM a nite collection of local link predicates are de ned i n a s c heme. Some examples of these are given below.
1. The take-grant link of 4, 7, 16 de ned as V g2domU _ U t2domU .
2. The take and grant links of 8 de ned as U t2domU and V g2domU respectively. 3. The send-receive link of 9, 11 de ned as V s2domU ^U r2domV . 4. The broadcast link of 14 de ned as U b2domU .
5. The universal link of 14 de ned as true.
For a given state if link i U,V is true we s a y there is a link i from U to V. W e emphasize that existence of a link is necessary but not su cient for copying tickets.
The nal condition required for authorizing a copy operation is speci ed by a lter function f i :TSTS! 2 TR for each predicate link i . The interpretation is that Y x:c can be copied from domU t o domV if and only if all of the following are true for some link i , where the types of U, V and Y are u, v and y respectively: Y xc2domU ^link i U,V ^y x:c2f i u,v Note that Y xc is required in domU whether we are authorized to copy Y xc or Y x by the lter function. In this manner the copy ag, link predicates and lter functions together authorize copying. We emphasize there is a di erent lter function for each link predicate.
Filter functions are a powerful tool for specifying policies. They impose mandatory controls which are inviolable and constrain the discretionary behavior of individual subjects. Some sample values for f i u,v are TR, TORI and . SPM imposes no assumptions regarding the role of U and V in a copy operation from U to V. It is equally acceptable that copying take place at the initiative o f U or V alone or require both to cooperate. This is consistent with a worst-case scenario for analysis in which complete cooperation between subjects is assumed.
THE CREATE OPERATION
The create operation introduces new subjects and objects in the system. There are two issues here: what types of entities can be created and which tickets are introduced as the immediate result of a create operation? The rst issue is speci ed in a scheme by the can-create relation ccTST. The interpretation is that subjects of type u are authorized to create entities of type v if and only if ccu, v. It is often convenient to regard cc as a function cc:TS! 2 T .
The tickets introduced by a create operation are speci ed by a create-rule cr for every pair in cc. SPM create-rules are local in that the only tickets introduced are for the creating and created entities in the domains of these two e n tities. The motivation is that creation should immediately have only a local incremental impact on the state. We emphasize there is a di erent create-rule for each pair in cc.
Let subject U of type u create entity V of type v, so U is the parent and V the child. If V is an object the only tickets that can be introduced by the create-rule are inert tickets for V in U 's domain. So if v is an object type the create-rule cru,v is speci ed as a subset of fchild x:cjx:c2RI g where child is a special symbol. The interpretation is that U gets V x:c if and only if child x:c2cru,v. If V is a subject the create-rule must also specify tickets to be placed in V 's domain. So if v is a subject type the create-rule cru,v has two components cr p u,v and cr c u,v which respectively specify tickets to be placed in the parent and child domains. Tickets for the parent and child are identi ed by the special symbols parent and child respectively. That is cr p u,v and cr c u,v are subsets of fparent x:c, child x:cjx:c2Rg.
The interpretation z is the parent U gets U x:c provided parent x:c2cr p u,v and gets V x:c provided child x:c2cr p u,v. Similarly the child V gets U x:c provided parent x:c2cr c u,v and V x:c provided child x:c2cr c u,v.
z Slightly di erent i n terpretations of the create-rules are discussed in section 4.
SUMMARY OF SPM
In summary SPM requires the security administrator to specify an authorization scheme by de ning the following nite components.
1. A set of entity t ypes T partitioned into subject types TS and object types TO. 2. A set of right symbols R partitioned into inert rights RI and control rights RC. A system is speci ed by de ning an authorization scheme and the initial protection state, i.e., the initial set of entities and the initial distribution of tickets. Thereafter the protection state evolves by copy and create operations. In SPM we s a y a right x is leaked if a ticket with the x right can be entered in a domain where it previously did not exist. The safety problem poses the question whether or not a particular right x can beleaked. It is obvious that any solution sequence for the modi ed strings is also a solution sequence for the original problem and vice versa. We call the class of problems obtained by this replacement a s P ost's problem with parenthesis, abbreviated pcp.
In this section we reduce pcp to the safety problem for SPM systems. Each string in pcp has at least three symbols. Moreover in a sequence of x strings or y strings no two consecutive symbols are identical. These properties are exploited in our construction and proof.
For a given instance of pcp we construct the corresponding SPM system as follows. Let x i,l signify the l Points 1 and 2 above are critical to the construction, particularly the idea of simulating the x i and y i strings respectively by a forward and backward sequence of creates, and connecting these strings at their end points. We can visualize cc as shown in gures 1 and 2. Each circle represents the subject type indicated alongside. Each edge represents the direction in which creation is authorized. Figure 1 pictures cc vertically. It shows that a x i,1 subject can create a x i,2 subject and so on to form a sequence corresponding to the string x i . The x i,l i subject at the end of this sequence can create a y i,m i subject as well as x j,1 subjects for j = 1 . . . n. The y i,m i subject can create a y i,m i -1 subject and so on to form a sequence corresponding to the string y i . In the same way each x j,1 subject can grow" a pair of x j and y j strings. This pattern can be repeated inde nitely. If we follow a path such as the one straight below x i,1 we can visualize a sequence of x strings paired with y strings as shown in gure 2. This gives us a horizontal view of cc ignoring the fan-out at the x i,l i subjects. This view is particularly useful for understanding the construction and proof.
We can set up the create-rules to introduce appropriate links between adjacent subjects in gure 2. This is almost enough to simulate a sequence of x strings x i 1 x i 2 . . . x i k paired with a corresponding sequence of y strings y i 1 y i 2 . . . y i k . There is however a missing connection between the end points of the y strings, for instance between the y i,m i and y j,1 subjects. Establishing this missing connection properly is the main complication. Particularly in that we want to prevent a similar connection from occurring between the y i,m i and y k,1 subjects. The key idea here is that the y i,m i subject is a direct child of the x i,l i subject, while the y j,1 subject is a closer descendant of the x i,l i subject than the y k,1 subject is. By carefully specifying the create-rules and lter functions we are able to establish the desired connection between the y i,m i and y j,1 subjects by a sequence of copy operations while preventing a similar connection between the y i,m i and y k,1 subjects. Once we are able to ensure the missing connections are properly established it remains to match the sequence of x strings and y strings subject by subject. This is done backwards by testing for a match at the end points of these two sequences. If a match exists it permits the subjects at the immediately preceding positions of the two sequences to be tested for a match and so on working our way back to the starting positions. This is the intuition behind the rest of the construction.
We de ne the following right symbols and link predicates with mnemonic signicance as indicated. Recall that links which do not exist in the initial state can beestablished by createrules as a side e ect of creation or by copy operations.
We n o w describe the role of the various links in our construction. Predecessor and successor links are established by the same right symbolp but in opposite directions. That is if U p2domV w e h a ve link s U,V and link p V,U . In this case U corresponds to the position that immediately precedes the position corresponding to V in a sequence of x or y strings. The link s 's are established in a pattern corresponding to the left to right direction in gure 2 with link p 's in the opposite direction. For the most part link p and link s are established by creation. The exceptions are link p 's and link s 's corresponding to the missing connections of gure 2, which are established by copy operations. The end, refer and adopt links are used for this purpose. The end link connects an x j,l j subject to a y j,m j subject which it creates. The refer link has a non-empty lter function only from an x j,1 subject to a y j,1 subject. It is established by a sequence of copy operations over link s 's from y j,m subjects to y j,m+1 subjects, a copy operation over a link e from a y j,m j subject to a x j,l j subject, and nally a sequence of copy operations over link p 's from x j,l subjects to x j,l-1 subjects. The refer link is then used to set up an adopt link from a y i,m i subject to a y j,1 subject, which in turn is used to establish the above mentioned missing connections. The test and match links are used to match a paired sequence of x strings and y strings working backwards from the end points. These bi-directional links have non-empty lter functions only between x i,l and y j,m subjects. A test link between X and Y can beconverted to a match link if and only if sym X = sym Y . A match link in turn is used to establish a test link by copy operations between subjects to which X and Y have link p 's. To begin this process test links are introduced at the end points by the create-rules for ccx i,l i ,y i,m i . De nition of the leak link amounts to requiring the match link and the refer link. The leak link can only beused to copy a x 1,1 l ticket from a x 1,1 subject to a y 1,1 subject. It reduces the problem of nding a solution to a given instance of pcp to that of establishing a leak link from a x 1,1 subject to a y 1,1 subject.
The above considerations motivate the following de nitions for the lter functions. Values not explicitly de ned are empty by default. The create-rules ensure that each subject has the mc and tc tickets for itself and introduce test and end links at the end points of a pair of x i $y i strings. They also establish the predecessor and successor links. Finally they introduce copiable refer, adopt and predecessor tickets required to establish the missing connections of gure 2. The formal statement of these rules is given below. As is usual in reduction proofs the more di cult part is to show the converse property. The fact that no consecutive identical symbols occur in a sequence of x strings or y strings in pcp is crucial to the proof. Theorem 2 If l can beleaked in the corresponding SPM system the given instance of pcp has a solution.
Proof: The only lc ticket is X 1 1,1 lc in the initial domain of X 1 1,1 , so l can be leaked only by copying X 1 1,1 l from X 1 1,1 to some y 1,1 subject, say Y 1 1,1 , via a link l . This amounts to requiring link m and link r from X 1 1,1 to Y 1 1,1 . A link m between X and Y subjects can be established only by m utual exchange of each other's m tickets using link t 's, which requires sym X = sym Y . The link t 's in turn are established by create-rules or copy operations. Creation establishes link t 's only at the end points of x and y strings, in which case we also have link e X,Y . Because each string in pcp has at least three symbols X 1 1,1 and Y 1 1,1 are not at the end points, so this case does not apply to them. Otherwise we m ust somehow copy Y t to X and vice versa. X can obtain Y t in one of two w ays shown in gures 3a and 3b. 
ATTENUATING CREATE-RULES
In this section we show safety remains undecidable even if all create operations are required to be attenuating. The general idea behind the attenuating restriction is that tickets given to a child at the moment of creation should besomehow derived from tickets available to its parent. Then, at least with respect to tickets, the child will be no more powerful" than its creator. Of course in SPM the type of the child may give it more power in the scheme than its parent has. For example consider the broadcast link link b U,V de ned by U b2domU . That is a subject with the self b ticket has a broadcast link to everybody in the system. The motivation for the attenuating restriction is that the child should get the broadcast ticket only if the parent also has the broadcast ticket. However the broadcast links from the child may bemuch more powerful than broadcast links from the parent as determined by f b . The attenuating restriction was pro tably used in our earlier work where it was shown that safety is decidable with loops cycles of length one in can-create provided the create-rules for loops are attenuating 14 . For loops the child and parent are of the same type so by attenuating the tickets we were really ensuring the child is no more powerful" than its parent. The safety algorithm of 14 is based on the observation that without creates safety is easily determined in polynomial time by simply executing copy operations until the state stabilizes. Creation is accommodated by breaking the analysis into two phases, as follows. This strategy works provided we h a ve a method for constructing a suitable augmented state. We have just shown in section 3 that there is no such method in general. On the other hand for acyclic can-create there is a straightforward method for phase 1. Let each subject create one entity o f e v ery type it is authorized to create. Repeat this procedure for all children and so on. Clearly then phase 1 is guaranteed to terminate if and only if cc is acyclic. This method correctly analyzes safety because if a subject creates two entities of the same type there is no di erence between them as far as the scheme is concerned. So from a worst-case viewpoint it su ces to create just one. In 14 this method was extended to handle attenuating loops by letting each subject create one child of its own type, if so authorized, and then simply ignoring the child for further creation in phase 1. This demonstration was important because attenuating loops were required to simulate models such as take-grant 7 in SPM.
With acyclic cc the tree of descendants created by a subject has nite depth, although its breadth is unbounded. As indicated above unbounded breadth is of no consequence for safety because multiple children of the same type add no power. The previous section shows that in general the tree cannot be truncated at some computable depth. For attenuating loops however the analysis of 14 allows us to truncate the tree very easily. This naturally leads us to consider whether this idea can begeneralized to cycles of length greater than one. In this section we show this is not possible.
The rst component of the attenuating restriction is that a newly created subject should not get more tickets than its creator. In our notation this is stated as follows.
I. cr c u,v cr p u,v This requirement seems almost necessary for any meaningful notion of attenuating.
However it not enough by itself. For instance cr c = cr p = fchild bg satis es this condition and introduces a broadcast ticket for the child in the child and parent domains. However the latter is totally useless. We clearly need to relate self b in the child domain to self b in the parent domain. We can achieve this in a numberof ways. Perhaps most straightforward is to interpret create-rules as upper bounds on the tickets which will actually be introduced, as follows.
II. Only those parent x:c and child x:c tickets for which self x:c ticket is already present in the creator's domain prior to the create operation, will beactually introduced by the create-rule.
Note that in this case parent x:c in cr p u,v has no e ect. This formulation is conservative in that tickets introduced by creation are truly derived from self tickets in the parent domain. We can even be more strict and require the strongly conservative formulation below.
II 0 . Only those parent x:c and child x:c tickets for which self xc ticket is already present in the creator's domain prior to the create operation, will beactually introduced by the create-rule.
In this case the parent is required to possess the xc ticket for itself before the create operation even if the create-rule only introduces x tickets. The actual formulation chosen in 14 w as the following non-conservative one. It stipulates that if a ticket for the created subject is placed in the creator's domain the creator should also get the corresponding ticket for itself.
II 00 . If child x:c2cr p u,v then parent x:c2cr p u,v.
With this formulation the parent m a y actually possess new tickets for itself as a result of creating a child. In a sense it makes creation attenuating after the fact rather then forcing it to be attenuating before the fact. It turns out it really does not matter which of these formulations we c hose. Safety is undecidable in general for all cases. We modify the create-rules for the scheme of section 3 t o b e attenuating as follows. It is clear that with the create-rules of 6 0 and the initial state of 7 0 every subject will possess the aemprtc tickets for itself and for its children. We n o w show that this has no e ect with respect to leaking l. Theorem 3 l can be leaked in the original SPM system of section 3 if and only if it can beleaked in the system obtained by modifying the create-rules to 6 0 and the initial state to 7 0 .
Proof: Since every ticket in the original system is also present in the modi ed system, if l can be leaked in the original system it can also be leaked in the modi ed system. For the converse we show the additional tickets in the modi ed system are of no consequence. In the modi ed system every subject possesses self aemprtc for itself and child aemprtc for every child. Consider the di erent rights in turn. In both systems only child ac tickets for y i,m i subjects can be copied and the other ac tickets in the modi ed system do not establish signi cant links, i.e., links with nonempty lter functions. Similarly ec tickets cannot be copied in either system and introduce the same signi cant links between a x i,l i subject and its y i,m i child. The self mc ticket exists for every subject in both systems. Since child m:c tickets cannot be copied the only signi cant link m 's that may result due to these are between some X i,l i and its Y i,m i c hild. However we still need to copy X i,l i m from X i,l i to Y i,m i in which case we can also copy Y i,m i m from Y i,m i to X i,l i in the original system. Similar arguments can bemade for the prtc rights. 2 
CONCLUSION
We have shown that safety for SPM systems with cyclic can-create relations is in general undecidable. This complements our earlier result that with acyclic can-create safety is decidable 14 . In 14 we also showed that safety remains decidable with loops cycles of length one in can-create provided the create-rules for loops are attenuating. We believe that attenuating loops cover all practical systems that might be considered, and have been unable to formulate a realistic SPM system for which this restriction cannot be met. In section 4 we h a ve shown that extending the attenuating restriction to all create-rules still leaves the safety problem undecidable. An interesting open question is whether or not SPM schemes with non-attenuating loops have a decidable safety problem.
The SPM framework has a rich structure and numerous theoretical questions can be posed. The ones of greatest interest at the moment pertain to the modeling power of SPM. In particular how does SPM compare in power with the monotonic access matrix of Harrison and Ruzzo 3 ? It is quite straightforward to express an SPM system in the latter formulation. Whether the converse is true is a crucial open question. We would bepleased if it turns out to bethe case. Then SPM could be viewed as an alternate formulation of the monotonic access matrix but with richer structure and a natural demarcation between its decidable and undecidable cases. 
